摘要
借款者付给银行经营者的“贿赂”与利差租金水平及经营者的给租成本呈正相关,经营者对个人福利的追求造成不良资产的逐渐积累,加大了银行的经营风险。贷款寻租行为是利差租金存在情况下银行经营者理性地对获利机会做出反应的结果,解决寻租问题的根本出路在于以市场利率取代现行的管制利率,并打破国有商业银行对贷款的相对垄断,但短期内还必须依靠加强金融监管和内部控制在一定程度上对其加以抑制。
We analyzed the bank manager's behavior in the process of the commercial bank's loan rent seeking by building a static Bayesian model, and concluded that the bribe that the borrower gives to the manager is positively correlated to the interest rate differences and the manager's giving rent cost. The manager's pursuit of his own welfare caused the gradual accumulation of the bank's bad asset. To solve this problem, we must substitute the present regulated interest rate with market interest rate and break the state owned bank's comparatively monopoly on the loan, but in the short run, we have to strengthen the financial supervision and the commercial bank's inner control.
出处
《广州广播电视大学学报》
2004年第2期29-32,共4页
Journal of Guangzhou Open University
关键词
商业银行
贷款
寻租行为
利差租金
贿赂
rent seeking
interest rate difference rent
the cost of giving rent
bribe.
