摘要
本文通过囚徒困境重复博弈模型的思想研究合作研发中参与人合作策略形成的条件,考察了不完全信息研发合作中参与人合作行为的基础,并在此基础上讨论了研发合作中合作预期收益、不合作激励和合作机会成本对参与人研发合作行为选择的影响。
We present in this paper an analysis of the possibility of R&D cooperation and the strategic selection of the players in the incomplete information repeated game on the basis of the prisoners' dilemma, discuss the effects on the R&D cooperation behavior of the expected cooperation payoff, the incentives of non-cooperation and the opportunity cost of cooperation.
出处
《运筹与管理》
CSCD
2004年第5期76-80,共5页
Operations Research and Management Science
关键词
技术经济
合作研发
策略选择
行为分析
technological economy
R&D cooperation
strategic selection
behavior analysis
