摘要
政企不分是我国企业的痼疾。在我国上市公司中,董事长和总经理具有政治关联的比例高达46%。政治关联是否影响了企业行为呢?文章以我国561家上市公司作为研究样本,发现存在政治关联的公司IPO抑价率高达129%,而无政治关联的企业IPO抑价率为118%。文章进一步分析了政治关联与不同产权性质公司IPO抑价的关系,发现政治关联显著加剧了国有上市公司的IPO抑价,而对民营上市公司的IPO抑价则不存在显著影响。文章认为,我国政府的改革目标和国企高管的个人利益这两大因素助推了国有上市公司的超高抑价,我国IPO市场化改革成功的前提条件之一是约束政治关联。
The integration of government administration with enterprise is a chronic illness in Chinese enterprises.The percentage of chairmen of boards and general managers with political connections is still as high as 46%in the Chinese listed companies.Do political connections affect corporate behavior?Based on a sample of 561listed companies in China,this paper comes to the conclusion that firms with political connections are underpriced by 129%and these without connections by 118%.It further makes the analysis of the relationship between political connections and IPO underpricing in companies with different ownership and shows that political connections significantly intensify IPO underpricing in state-owned enterprises and have no significant effect on IPO underpricing in private listed companies.It argues that two factors,reform aim of Chinese government and SOE executives' interests,help to advance ultrahigh underpricing in state-owned listed companies and the restriction on political connections is prerequisite for the success of IPO market-oriented reform in China.
出处
《财经研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第6期16-26,120,共12页
Journal of Finance and Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71272179)
教育部重大课题攻关项目(13JZD006)
教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划(NCET-12-0288)
关键词
控股股东
政治关联
IPO抑价
市场化改革
controlling shareholder
political connection
IPO underpricing
market-oriented reform
