摘要
技术联盟研发投资决策一直是技术联盟成功与否的关键,对决策权的争夺是联盟伙伴动态博弈的结果。基于这种目的,构筑一个政府、国内企业与跨国公司的三边博弈模型,通过分析技术联盟研发投资的决策结果发现:政府部门的补贴越高,企业研发的努力程度就越高,并且其努力程度与联盟伙伴的努力程度呈负相关关系;对跨国公司来说,其要求的股权必须保证一定的比例才能保证联盟的稳定运行。因此从企业和政府的角度提出具有建设性的对策措施,对增强我国自主创新能力将具有十分重要的意义。
The R& D investment decision-making is the key to the success of the technology alliance and the controlling of the decision-making power is the results of the dynamic game among the partners.For this purpose,this paper builds a trilateral investment model of the R&D among the government,the domestic enterprises and transnational corporations in technology decision-making,and the results find that the more the governmental subsidization,the more the enterprise s efforts,and that its effort extent and the le...
出处
《哈尔滨工业大学学报（社会科学版）》
2008年第3期124-127,共4页
Journal of Harbin Institute of Technology(Social Sciences Edition)
关键词
技术联盟
研究开发
投资决策
technical alliance
research development
investment decision-making
