摘要
国有企业发展混合所有制是基本经济制度的重要实现形式。"国企混改"的重要政策目标是增强国有经济的控制力和抗风险能力,而内部控制质量是微观企业控制力以及抗风险能力的重要体现。本文选取2009-2018年沪深A股上市国企为样本,从内部控制质量层面实证检验了"国企混改"对公司治理的影响,并从外部压力与内部动力两个层面探讨了其作用机理。研究结果表明:(1)当国企仅实现股权多样性时,并不能显著提升内部控制质量;而当"混改"国企形成一定的股权制衡时,才对内部控制质量有显著的促进作用;(2)当国有股东与非国有股东存在关联时,会削弱"国企混改"形成的混合股权结构对内部控制质量的正向效应;"混改"在国企内部形成的混合股权结构在市场化程度低的地区对内部控制质量的提升效应更加显著;(3)"国企混改"影响内部控制质量存在外部压力和内部动力两个渠道机制,即"国企混改"通过强化外部舆论监督压力和增强内部高管业绩动力而提高了内部控制质量。本文补充了"国企混改"的经济后果文献,同时对如何推进"混改"具有参考价值。
This paper takes the 2009-2018 Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed State-owned enterprises(hereinafter referred to as"SOE")as a sample,and empirically tests the impact of the Reform of Mixed Ownership of State-owned Enterprises(hereinafter referred to as"MRSE")on the quality of internal control.The results show that:(1)when the SOE only realizes the equity diversity,it cannot significantly improve the quality of internal control;and when the MRSE of the SOE forms a certain balance of equity,it can significantly promote the quality of internal control;(2)when there is a relationship between the main shareholders of the SOE,the mixed ownership structure cannot significantly improve the quality of internal control.And its effect on improving the quality of internal control is more significant in areas with low marketization;(3)we find two ways in which MRSE affects the quality of internal control of SOE,strengthening external public opinion supervision and improving the sensitivity of compensation-performance of the senior executives.This paper supplements the literature on the economic consequences of MRSE and has important reference value for how to promote the MRSE.
出处
《会计研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第8期144-158,共15页
Accounting Research
基金
湖南省社科智库重大项目(18ZWA19)
湖南省研究生科研创新一般项目(CX20190327)的阶段性成果
关键词
国企混改
内部控制质量
股东关联性
渠道机制
State-owned Enterprise
Mixed Ownership Reform
Internal Control Quality
Shareholder Relationship
Mechanism
