摘要
《关于建立国有企业违规经营投资责任追究制度的意见》首次提出了对国有企业高管实行重大决策终身责任追究。基于这一重要的政策冲击,本文检验了对高管经营投资行为的事后追责对国有企业风险承担的影响。结果发现,责任追究制度能够降低国有企业的风险承担水平、抑制国有企业的过度风险承担从而提高其风险承担效率。机制分析显示,责任追究制度通过影响管理层的风险偏好发挥风险承担抑制效应;通过改善资本投资和财务杠杆等决策,制度抑制了国有企业寻租式的高风险行为,降低了企业的破产风险;此外,经营投资责任的加强也增强了风险承担对企业价值的提升作用。本文为责任追究制度的正向实施效果提供了初步经验证据,结论对于完善国有资本监管体系和促进国有企业高质量发展具有重要启示。
Based on the introduction of SOEs’accountability system for the illegal operation and investment in 2016,this paper examines the effect of the post-accountability for managers’major decisions on SOEs’risk-taking.We find that explicit accountability system can reduce the risk-taking level of SOEs,which is mainly reflected in restraining excessive risk-taking and improving the risk-taking efficiency.The risk-taking effect is more pronounced in SOEs which are regulated strictly by government or with chairman near retirement,and in areas with strong anti-corruption efforts.The mechanism analysis shows that the accountability system reduces the risk-taking through affecting the risk appetite of management.And by improving capital expenditures and financial leverage decisions,it restrains SOEs’rent-seeking high-risk behaviors and reduces SOEs’risk of bankruptcy.We further find strengthening the liability for illegal operation and investment enhances the effect of risk-taking on improving corporate value.The conclusion has important enlightenment for improving the supervision of state-owned assets and promoting the high-quality development of state-owned listed companies.
出处
《会计研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2022年第4期53-70,共18页
Accounting Research
基金
国家自然科学基金(71872198)资助
关键词
违规经营投资责任追究
风险承担
终身追责
国有企业
Accountability for Illegal Operation and Investment
Risk-taking
Lifelong Accountability
State-owned Enterprises
