摘要
目前证券监管采取的"追首恶"方式错误地援用了控股股东信义义务理论,过于强调实际控制人的可追责性,反而在公司治理结构上模糊了实际控制人与上市公司之间应有的责任边界。应在厘清股东信义义务的公司法边界的基础上转换证券法上实际控制人法律责任的理论基础,构建以董事责任为主的追责体系。当实际控制人以控制公司的方式损害公司利益时,其承担的是事实董事的角色,非控股股东可以通过股东派生诉讼追究实际控制人违反董事信义义务的责任。如果此类控制导致了证券法上的违法后果,则实际控制人应作为法定的违法行为人之一承担直接责任。在此区分下,可以借鉴美国法上以反欺诈条款为请求权基础的派生诉讼制度来保障非控股股东的诉权选择。在实际控制人法律责任问题上,应实现公司治理结构的理念矫正与证券违法行为追责的逻辑转换。
Currently China is incorrectly relying on the fiduciary duty theory in the company law to pursue the liability of the controlling person in securities regulation.Over-emphasizing the role of the controlling person in a list company will blur the liability boundary between the controlling person and the list company in the corporation governance.China should,on the basis of clarifying the boundary of the fiduciary duty of the controlling person of a list company in the company law,change the logical basis of the controlling liability in the securities law.If the controlling person harms the interest of a list company by his control of the company,he shall assume the role as a de facto director and be liable for the violation of the director’s fiduciary duty in the derivative litigation brought by minority shareholders.Furthermore,if such control leads to the violation of the securities law,the controlling person should be considered as one of the statutory violators who will bear the same direct and primary liability as that of the list company in the class action brought by minority shareholders,without the need for introducing the joint liability theory under the traditional tort law to judge the controlling person’s liability.
出处
《法学研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第2期95-106,共12页
Chinese Journal of Law
基金
2020年度国家社科基金项目“证券发行注册制法律实施机制研究”(20BFX130)的阶段性成果
关键词
实际控制人
法人人格
信义义务
事实董事
股东派生诉讼
controlling person
legal personality
fiduciary duty
de facto director
derivative litigation
