摘要
政府对企业的薪酬管制可能诱发高管的道德风险问题,表现为减少努力程度从而降低企业绩效,以及增加在职消费。借助“限薪令2015”提供的自然实验,从企业绩效、在职消费两个维度识别薪酬管制的影响。基于2013~2017年1129家A股上市公司数据,采用双重差分法(DID)的回归分析发现:薪酬管制对企业绩效未产生显著影响,但显著促进了企业高管的在职消费。研究结论表明政策制定应充分考虑经济主体激励的改变,并对由此产生的间接影响加强评估。
The government's salary regulation of enterprises may induce the moral hazard of senior executives,which is manifested in reducing the degree of effort to damage enterprise performance and increasing perk consumption.With the natural experiment provided by the“salary limit order 2015”,identify the impact of salary regulation from the two dimensions of enterprise performance and perk consumption.Based on the data of 1129 A-share listed companies from 2013 to 2017,the regression using difference-in-difference method(DID)finds that salary regulation has no significant impact on enterprise performance,but significantly promotes perk consumption of enterprise executives.The research conclusion shows that policy-making should fully consider the change of incentives of economic subjects,and strengthen the evaluation of the indirect impact.
作者
王猛
刘路瑶
Meng Wang;Luyao Liu(International Business School,Shaanxi Normal University,Xian,China;Management School,Hainan University,Haikou,China)
出处
《南大商学评论》
2022年第1期219-229,共11页
Nanjing Business Review
基金
教育部人文社会科学青年基金“内部治理、外部环境与企业技术创新研究”(19XJC790005)
关键词
薪酬管制
在职消费
企业绩效
自然实验
Salary Regulation
Perk Consumption
Enterprise Performance
Natural Experiment
