摘要
文章选取2008-2017年沪深A股3449上市公司的23193个样本数据,实证检验了高管学术经历与企业分红水平的关系。研究发现,相比于高管无学术经历的企业,有学术经历高管企业的分红水平显著更高。高管的学术经历通过缓解融资约束,而不是缓解过度投资的路径显著提高企业分红水平。在进一步的研究中,通过引入外部治理与企业产权性质影响因素,发现外部治理较弱、非国有企业的情况下,高管的学术经历对企业分红水平的提高作用更加明显。采用倾向得分匹配法(PSM)、工具变量回归等检验结果依然稳健。研究丰富了高层梯队理论与企业分红相关性的文献,发现了中国情境下影响企业分红的新因素。
The phenomenon of non-dividend and less dividends of listed companies in China has become a problem that plagues China’s capital market.In addition,small and medium-sized investors do not have a strong sense of protecting their own rights,so their share out dividends have been greatly damaged.Since the reform and opening up,there has been a phenomenon of"literatures going to sea to do business"in China.Some people who hold posts in universities,scientific research institutes or trade associations have entered into the role of senior executives in enterprises.The academic experience characteristics of these senior executives have attracted the research and attention of scholars in recent years.At present,there is no literature that combines the academic experience of senior executives with the dividend policy of enterprises.As the characteristics of senior executives with Chinese characteristics,the academic experience of senior executives is of great significance for solving the dividend problem of listed companies in China.This paper selects 23,193 sample data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share 3449 listed companies from 2008 to 2017 to empirically test the relationship between the academic experience of senior executives and the level of corporate dividends.The study found that:(1)Companies with academic experience had higher bonus levels than those without.Senior executives with academic experience,based on the experience of teaching and scientific research in universities,have a higher moral level and sense of responsibility,are more rigorous and rational in dealing with people,and attach more importance to their own reputation and image.Therefore,they will spontaneously form a self-supervision and constraint mechanism.Through such self-supervision and constraint mechanism,senior executives can alleviate agency conflicts in principal-agent relationship,improve the disposable cash amount and cash payment ability of enterprises,and thus effectively improve the level of dividends of enterprises.(2)It is found in the mechanism test that the academic experience of senior executives significantly improves the level of corporate dividends by easing financing constraints,rather than easing excessive investment.This is because the self-discipline executives can improve the information disclosure,improve the quality of accounting information,and can ease the agency conflict to reduce external financing costs,therefore ease enterprise financing constraints by relieving information asymmetry and agency problems,make enterprise disposable cash increase and reduce the burden of share out bonus of the firm.(3)In the further study,through the introduction of external governance and the nature of enterprise property rights,it is found that in the case of weak external governance and non-state-owned enterprises,the academic experience of senior executives plays a more obvious role in improving the level of enterprise dividends.The results of PSM and regression of instrumental variables were still robust.The research enriches the literature on the correlation between the theory of high-level echelon and corporate dividend,and finds out the new factors that affect corporate dividend in Chinese context.
作者
王德建
冯兰时
Wang Dejian;Feng Lanshi
出处
《南方经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第3期89-105,共17页
South China Journal of Economics
基金
山东大学基本科研业务(人文社科青年团队)项目“基于企业社会责任视角的创业企业成长机理研究”(IFYT15001)
山东省社科规划项目“中小企业社会责任与融资约束研究”(14VKJJ10)资助
关键词
高管学术经历
企业分红
融资约束
过度投资
Executive Academic Experience
Corporate Dividend
Financing Constraints
Excessive Investment
