摘要
共同配送是解决快递末端配送资源浪费严重、服务质量低劣等问题的有效措施。由于我国的快递共同配送研究起步较晚、经验缺乏等原因,其应用率并不高,且形成的共同配送联盟难以保持长期稳定的合作关系。为探究提升多方共同配送合作稳定性的有利条件,本文构建了三方参与的快递末端共同配送联盟演化博弈模型,以企业投入等因素为依据,将联盟成员按照规模大小划分为三类,分析了不同规模的企业在一定条件下共同配送合作过程中的策略选择,并通过仿真模拟的方式确定了三方趋于合作的条件。结果表明:初始合作意愿、收益分配占比、惩罚获利以及企业间的依赖度对联盟成员的策略选择以及联盟的稳定性有着重要影响。企业规模不同,对影响因素的敏感程度亦不同。
Joint distribution is an effective measure to solve the problems of serious waste of resources and poor service quality.Due to the late start of express joint distribution research and lack of experience in China,the application rate of joint distribution is not appreciable,and the formed joint distribution alliance is difficult to maintain a long-term and stable cooperative relationship.In order to explore the favorable conditions for promoting stability in multi-party cooperation,this paper constructs an evolutionary game model of joint distribution alliance with the participation of three-party.Based on enterprise investment and other factors,the alliance members are divided into three categories according to its scale.This paper analyzes the strategic choice of different enterprises in the process of joint distribution under certain conditions and uses simulation analysis to determine conditions under which the three-party strategy tends to cooperate.The results show that the initial willingness to cooperate,the proportion of benefit distribution,the intensity of punishment and the degree of dependence among enterprises have important impacts on strategic choice of alliance members and the stability of the alliance.With the different enterprise sizes,the sensitivity to influencing factors is different.
作者
孔继利
张鹏坤
刘晓平
KONG Ji-li;ZHANG Peng-kun;LIU Xiao-ping(School of Modern Post,Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications,Beijing 100876,China)
出处
《物流研究》
2022年第2期69-85,共17页
Logistics Research
基金
国家重点研发计划项目(2018YFB1403100)
教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(20YJC630054)
关键词
快递末端
共同配送
演化博弈
复制动态方程
Express Terminal
Joint Distribution
Evolutionary Game
Replicated Dynamic Equation
