Taking the advanced technology of the foreign firm into account, a mixed duopoly three-stage game model is established in the context of research and development（RD）investment subsidies and product subsidies for dom...Taking the advanced technology of the foreign firm into account, a mixed duopoly three-stage game model is established in the context of research and development（RD）investment subsidies and product subsidies for domestic firms provided by the government, and the RD subsidy policy of domestic firms in competition with foreign firms is analyzed.The equilibrium output, RD investment of the domestic firm, social welfare and the value of government subsidies are derived, in the case of the two policies, RD investment subsidies and product subsidies for domestic firms, provided by the government. The results show that, the equilibrium output and the optimal social welfare under the RD investment subsidy policy are both less than those under the product subsidy policy; the optimal RD investment under the RD investment subsidy policy is less than that under the product subsidy policy; and the RD product subsidy has a more obvious incentive effect on firm RD investment. Under the background of the leading edge of technology of foreign firms, the product subsidy policy drawn up by the government to encourage RD innovation of domestic firms is more effective than the RD investment subsidy policy.展开更多
This work studies entry and technology transfer in a Cournot model where there are two domestic firms. A foreign firm has a patent on a technological innovation that reduces the costs of all firms. The foreign firm ca...This work studies entry and technology transfer in a Cournot model where there are two domestic firms. A foreign firm has a patent on a technological innovation that reduces the costs of all firms. The foreign firm can license the innovation to one or both domestic firms. The authors consider two standard licensing policies： （1） auction policy and （2） unit royalty policy. The foreign firm can license the innovation either by staying outside the domestic market, or it can enter the market, license the innovation and compete with the domestic firms. The authors show that （1） when the foreign firm stays outside, it is never optimal for it to use royalties, （2） if it licenses the innovation by entering the industry, then royalties could be optimal and （3） when it decides on its entry strategy by taking its optimal licensing policies into account, it always finds it optimal to enter the domestic market.展开更多
基金The Special Project of Innovative Methods and Work Funded by Ministry of National Science and Technology of China(No.2013IM030600)
文摘Taking the advanced technology of the foreign firm into account, a mixed duopoly three-stage game model is established in the context of research and development（RD）investment subsidies and product subsidies for domestic firms provided by the government, and the RD subsidy policy of domestic firms in competition with foreign firms is analyzed.The equilibrium output, RD investment of the domestic firm, social welfare and the value of government subsidies are derived, in the case of the two policies, RD investment subsidies and product subsidies for domestic firms, provided by the government. The results show that, the equilibrium output and the optimal social welfare under the RD investment subsidy policy are both less than those under the product subsidy policy; the optimal RD investment under the RD investment subsidy policy is less than that under the product subsidy policy; and the RD product subsidy has a more obvious incentive effect on firm RD investment. Under the background of the leading edge of technology of foreign firms, the product subsidy policy drawn up by the government to encourage RD innovation of domestic firms is more effective than the RD investment subsidy policy.
文摘This work studies entry and technology transfer in a Cournot model where there are two domestic firms. A foreign firm has a patent on a technological innovation that reduces the costs of all firms. The foreign firm can license the innovation to one or both domestic firms. The authors consider two standard licensing policies： （1） auction policy and （2） unit royalty policy. The foreign firm can license the innovation either by staying outside the domestic market, or it can enter the market, license the innovation and compete with the domestic firms. The authors show that （1） when the foreign firm stays outside, it is never optimal for it to use royalties, （2） if it licenses the innovation by entering the industry, then royalties could be optimal and （3） when it decides on its entry strategy by taking its optimal licensing policies into account, it always finds it optimal to enter the domestic market.
