The Beijing spectrometer Ⅲ （BESⅢ） beam pipe is in the center of the BESⅢ, which is the detector of the upgrade project of Beijing electron and positron collider （BEPC Ⅱ）. Electrons and positrons collide in the...The Beijing spectrometer Ⅲ （BESⅢ） beam pipe is in the center of the BESⅢ, which is the detector of the upgrade project of Beijing electron and positron collider （BEPC Ⅱ）. Electrons and positrons collide in the BESⅢ beam pipe. According to the demands of the BEPC Ⅱ, a key program of Chinese Academy of Sciences, the BESⅢ beam pipe is designed based on the finite elements analysis. The BESIII beam pipe is installed in the inner cylinder of the BESⅢ drift chamber. As a vacuum tube, the BESIII beam pipe is designed as 1 000 mm in length, 63 mm in inner diameter and 114 mm in outer diameter, respectively. The BESIII beam pipe consists of a central beryllium pipe cooled by EDM-1, the oil No.1 for electric discharge machining, and two extended copper pipes cooled by deionized water （DW）. The three parts are jointed by vacuum welding. Factors taken into account in the design are as follows. ① The wall thickness of the central beryllium pipe should be designed as small as possible to reduce the multi-scattering and improve the particle momentum resolution. And the wall thickness of the extended copper pipe should be designed as large as possible to protect the detectors from the backgrounds. ②The BESⅢ beam pipe must be sufficiently cooled to avoid the damage and prevents its influence to the BESⅢ drift chamber （DC） operation. The inner surface temperature of the DC inner cylinder must be maintained at 293±2 K. ③ The magnetic permeability of the materials used in the BESⅢ beam pipe must be less than 1.05 H/m to avoid large magnetic field distortions. ④ The static pressure of the vacuum chamber of the BESⅢ beam pipe must be less than 800 μPa. The simulating results show that the designed structure of the BESⅢ beam pipe satisfies the requirements mentioned above. The structure design scheme is evaluated and adonted hv the headouarters of BEPCⅡ.展开更多
One of the assumptions of previous research in evolutionary game dynamics is that individuals use only one rule to update their strategy. In reality, an individual's strategy update rules may change with the envir...One of the assumptions of previous research in evolutionary game dynamics is that individuals use only one rule to update their strategy. In reality, an individual's strategy update rules may change with the environment, and it is possible for an individual to use two or more rules to update their strategy. We consider the case where an individual updates strategies based on the Moran and imitation processes, and establish mixed stochastic evolutionary game dynamics by combining both processes. Our aim is to study how individuals change strategies based on two update rules and how this affects evolutionary game dynamics. We obtain an analytic expression and properties of the fixation probability and fixation times(the unconditional fixation time or conditional average fixation time) associated with our proposed process. We find unexpected results. The fixation probability within the proposed model is independent of the probabilities that the individual adopts the imitation rule update strategy. This implies that the fixation probability within the proposed model is equal to that from the Moran and imitation processes. The one-third rule holds in the proposed mixed model. However, under weak selection, the fixation times are different from those of the Moran and imitation processes because it is connected with the probability that individuals adopt an imitation update rule. Numerical examples are presented to illustrate the relationships between fixation times and the probability that an individual adopts the imitation update rule, as well as between fixation times and selection intensity. From the simulated analysis, we find that the fixation time for a mixed process is greater than that of the Moran process, but is less than that of the imitation process. Moreover, the fixation times for a cooperator in the proposed process increase as the probability of adopting an imitation update increases; however, the relationship becomes more complex than a linear relationship.展开更多
We study the stochastic evolutionary public goods game with punishment in a finite size population. Two kinds of costly punishments are considered, i.e., first-order punishment in which only the defectors are punished...We study the stochastic evolutionary public goods game with punishment in a finite size population. Two kinds of costly punishments are considered, i.e., first-order punishment in which only the defectors are punished, and second-order punishment in which both the defectors and the cooperators who do not punish the defective behaviors are punished. We focus on the stochastic stable equilibrium of the system. In the population, the evolutionary process of strategies is described as a finite state Markov process. The evolutionary equilibrium of the system and its stochastic stability are analyzed by the limit distribution of the Markov process. By numerical experiments, our findings are as follows.（i） The first-order costly punishment can change the evolutionary dynamics and equilibrium of the public goods game, and it can promote cooperation only when both the intensity of punishment and the return on investment parameters are large enough.（ii）Under the first-order punishment, the further imposition of the second-order punishment cannot change the evolutionary dynamics of the system dramatically, but can only change the probability of the system to select the equilibrium points in the ＂C＋P＂ states, which refer to the co-existence states of cooperation and punishment. The second-order punishment has limited roles in promoting cooperation, except for some critical combinations of parameters.（iii） When the system chooses＂C＋P＂ states with probability one, the increase of the punishment probability under second-order punishment will further increase the proportion of the ＂P＂ strategy in the ＂C＋P＂ states.展开更多
To obtain a kind of biodegradable polymer material with satisfactory properties, a new biodegradable copolyester poly（lactic acid-co-glycol terephthalate） （PETA）, was synthesized from three monomers of lactic acid...To obtain a kind of biodegradable polymer material with satisfactory properties, a new biodegradable copolyester poly（lactic acid-co-glycol terephthalate） （PETA）, was synthesized from three monomers of lactic acid, glycol and terephthalic acid. The resulting copolyesters, PETA, were characterized by FT-IR, ^1H-NMR, DSC, TGA and by the ways of weight loss rate to characterize their biodegradability. The findings in this work indicated that, the Tins and Tas of copolyesters PETA increased with increasing contents of the terephthalic acid units. From the biodegradation tests in natural soil, boiling water, acid buffer solution and alkali buffer solution, it was shown that the biodegradability of copolyesters PETA decreased with increasing contents of the terephthalic acid units.展开更多
基金Key Programs of Chinese Academy of Sciences(No.KJ95T-03)
文摘The Beijing spectrometer Ⅲ （BESⅢ） beam pipe is in the center of the BESⅢ, which is the detector of the upgrade project of Beijing electron and positron collider （BEPC Ⅱ）. Electrons and positrons collide in the BESⅢ beam pipe. According to the demands of the BEPC Ⅱ, a key program of Chinese Academy of Sciences, the BESⅢ beam pipe is designed based on the finite elements analysis. The BESIII beam pipe is installed in the inner cylinder of the BESⅢ drift chamber. As a vacuum tube, the BESIII beam pipe is designed as 1 000 mm in length, 63 mm in inner diameter and 114 mm in outer diameter, respectively. The BESIII beam pipe consists of a central beryllium pipe cooled by EDM-1, the oil No.1 for electric discharge machining, and two extended copper pipes cooled by deionized water （DW）. The three parts are jointed by vacuum welding. Factors taken into account in the design are as follows. ① The wall thickness of the central beryllium pipe should be designed as small as possible to reduce the multi-scattering and improve the particle momentum resolution. And the wall thickness of the extended copper pipe should be designed as large as possible to protect the detectors from the backgrounds. ②The BESⅢ beam pipe must be sufficiently cooled to avoid the damage and prevents its influence to the BESⅢ drift chamber （DC） operation. The inner surface temperature of the DC inner cylinder must be maintained at 293±2 K. ③ The magnetic permeability of the materials used in the BESⅢ beam pipe must be less than 1.05 H/m to avoid large magnetic field distortions. ④ The static pressure of the vacuum chamber of the BESⅢ beam pipe must be less than 800 μPa. The simulating results show that the designed structure of the BESⅢ beam pipe satisfies the requirements mentioned above. The structure design scheme is evaluated and adonted hv the headouarters of BEPCⅡ.
基金Project supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant Nos.71871171,71871173,and 71832010)
文摘One of the assumptions of previous research in evolutionary game dynamics is that individuals use only one rule to update their strategy. In reality, an individual's strategy update rules may change with the environment, and it is possible for an individual to use two or more rules to update their strategy. We consider the case where an individual updates strategies based on the Moran and imitation processes, and establish mixed stochastic evolutionary game dynamics by combining both processes. Our aim is to study how individuals change strategies based on two update rules and how this affects evolutionary game dynamics. We obtain an analytic expression and properties of the fixation probability and fixation times(the unconditional fixation time or conditional average fixation time) associated with our proposed process. We find unexpected results. The fixation probability within the proposed model is independent of the probabilities that the individual adopts the imitation rule update strategy. This implies that the fixation probability within the proposed model is equal to that from the Moran and imitation processes. The one-third rule holds in the proposed mixed model. However, under weak selection, the fixation times are different from those of the Moran and imitation processes because it is connected with the probability that individuals adopt an imitation update rule. Numerical examples are presented to illustrate the relationships between fixation times and the probability that an individual adopts the imitation update rule, as well as between fixation times and selection intensity. From the simulated analysis, we find that the fixation time for a mixed process is greater than that of the Moran process, but is less than that of the imitation process. Moreover, the fixation times for a cooperator in the proposed process increase as the probability of adopting an imitation update increases; however, the relationship becomes more complex than a linear relationship.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant Nos.71501149 and 71231007)the Soft Science Project of Hubei Province,China(Grant No.2017ADC122)the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities,China(Grant No.WUT:2017VI070)
文摘We study the stochastic evolutionary public goods game with punishment in a finite size population. Two kinds of costly punishments are considered, i.e., first-order punishment in which only the defectors are punished, and second-order punishment in which both the defectors and the cooperators who do not punish the defective behaviors are punished. We focus on the stochastic stable equilibrium of the system. In the population, the evolutionary process of strategies is described as a finite state Markov process. The evolutionary equilibrium of the system and its stochastic stability are analyzed by the limit distribution of the Markov process. By numerical experiments, our findings are as follows.（i） The first-order costly punishment can change the evolutionary dynamics and equilibrium of the public goods game, and it can promote cooperation only when both the intensity of punishment and the return on investment parameters are large enough.（ii）Under the first-order punishment, the further imposition of the second-order punishment cannot change the evolutionary dynamics of the system dramatically, but can only change the probability of the system to select the equilibrium points in the ＂C＋P＂ states, which refer to the co-existence states of cooperation and punishment. The second-order punishment has limited roles in promoting cooperation, except for some critical combinations of parameters.（iii） When the system chooses＂C＋P＂ states with probability one, the increase of the punishment probability under second-order punishment will further increase the proportion of the ＂P＂ strategy in the ＂C＋P＂ states.
文摘To obtain a kind of biodegradable polymer material with satisfactory properties, a new biodegradable copolyester poly（lactic acid-co-glycol terephthalate） （PETA）, was synthesized from three monomers of lactic acid, glycol and terephthalic acid. The resulting copolyesters, PETA, were characterized by FT-IR, ^1H-NMR, DSC, TGA and by the ways of weight loss rate to characterize their biodegradability. The findings in this work indicated that, the Tins and Tas of copolyesters PETA increased with increasing contents of the terephthalic acid units. From the biodegradation tests in natural soil, boiling water, acid buffer solution and alkali buffer solution, it was shown that the biodegradability of copolyesters PETA decreased with increasing contents of the terephthalic acid units.
